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Abstract
This note provides an introduction to the PPATS Commitment Con-
sistent Encryption (CCE) scheme proposed by Cuvelier, Pereira and Pe-
ters [7] and its use in the design of end-to-end verifiable elections with
a perfectly private audit trail. These elections can be verified using au-
dit data that will never leak any information about the vote, even if all
the private keys of the elections are compromised, or if the cryptographic
assumptions are broken.
1 Introduction
The verification process of end-to-end verifiable elections includes the examina-
tion of a set of audit data made available, usually through a public website, to
anyone who would like to verify the election. Once these audit data are released,
they can be copied by numerous people around the world and stored for ever.
In order to make sure that these data hide the votes but still bind the votes to
the election result, that is, prove that this result is correct, they are typically
produced using various cryptographic techniques.
In most end-to-end verifiable voting schemes, these hiding and binding prop-
erties of the audit data are not absolute. They rely on the assumption that pieces
of secret information held by some trustees remain secret and on the assump-
tion that solving some mathematical problems cannot be done because it would
require way too much computational power. This is the case, for instance, when
the audit data contain votes that are encrypted with a public key encryption
scheme (ElGamal, Paillier, . . . ), or are hidden thanks to the use of a pseudoran-
dom generator, or when the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is used to produce efficient
non-interactive validity proofs.
The two flavors in which non absolute security properties appear, that is,
depending on keeping secrets and depending on computational assumptions,
are actually fairly different. Stealing secret information is something that may
happen at any time or, hopefully, will not happen at all. But, if it happens, it is
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likely to happen during the election, as this is when the secrets are manipulated
— they should normally be destroyed after that. By contrast, computational
advances are expected to happen no matter what, but we can try to estimate
their pace and reasonably hope that they will not happen before several years.
In some cases though, we can design schemes that have absolute or perfect
security properties. We know that these schemes will never be broken, indepen-
dently of any stolen keys or computing advances. Unfortunately, we also know
that, under natural settings, we cannot have a voting scheme that offers the
perfect flavors of the binding and hiding properties.
Let us now consider the consequences of stolen secrets and computational
advances on our hiding and binding properties. Regarding the binding property,
all end-to-end verifiable systems are designed in such a way that the correctness
of the result does not depend on secret information kept by trustees: these
trustees would de facto be able to fake the election results, which is far more
trust than we are ready to give them. The impact of computational progresses
on the binding property still exists, but is much more benign: if some advances
make it possible, in several years, to create new audit data that would pass
an election verification procedure and support a different result, such data will
not convince anyone since we will know that the strength of the cryptographic
schemes on which the verification procedure relies is gone. Furthermore, the
election results would have been validated for a long time, and it would be
impossible to change anything anyway. So, proofs must be available when they
are needed, but may become unconvincing in the future, when they do not
matter anymore.
Regarding the hiding property, stolen secret information would typically
result in the loss of privacy of the votes, which certainly is very damaging. The
eventual compromise of the privacy of the votes due to computational advances
is also a problematic threat: this perspective can be sufficient to enable coercion,
which is the main threat that the secret ballot is expected to prevent.
The discussion above is summarized in Table 1. This table suggests that
targeting a perfect flavor of the hiding property is quite appealing, as it would
eliminate the threats from the last line of the table. This imposes keeping a
computational flavor of verifiability, but this looks acceptable as long as this
verifiability does not rely on keeping secrets. These are the properties we are
targeting in this note, which are also summarized in Table 2.
compromise of secret computational advances
information in the future
Binding breaks due to: Cannot happen in Benign effect
E2E verifiable systems
Hiding breaks due to: Highly Damaging
Damaging and unavoidable
Table 1: Effect of cryptographic issues on the binding and hiding properties of
public audit data in most end-to-end verifiable election systems.
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compromise of secret computational advances
information in the future
Binding breaks due to: Cannot happen Benign effect
Hiding breaks due to: Cannot happen Cannot happen
Table 2: Effect of cryptographic issues on the binding and hiding properties of
public audit data when using a perfectly private audit trail.
2 Commitment-Consistent Encryption
Commitment-consistent encryption (CCE) schemes [7] are cryptographic mech-
anisms that can provide verifiable elections with the properties described in
Table 2.
In many large scale verifiable election schemes, votes are transmitted to a set
of trustees under the protection of a public key encryption mechanism. However,
the ciphertexts produced by a public key encryption mechanisms cannot be
perfectly hiding and, therefore, cannot be part of our election audit data.
Commitment-consistent encryption schemes are public key encryption sche-
mes with an extra feature that addresses this issue: from any encrypted vote, it
is possible to extract a perfectly hiding commitment that is consistent with that
vote. That commitment can be part of the audit data, be verified by anyone,
and we are sure that it cannot be manipulated without breaking the binding
property of the commitment scheme.
2.1 Computational setting
We are looking for efficient instances of CCE schemes that can be easily used
in a distributed setting. For this reason, the schemes that we discuss here work
with elements of public prime order groups. This in particular enables efficient
distributed key generation [9] and the manipulation of integers that are shorter
than those occurring in schemes that rely on the hardness of factoring.
So, we are going to compute in cyclic groups of prime order q. We refer to
these groups with the letter G, possibly indexed, and use the letters g and h to
denote generators of such groups.
The computational security of our schemes is guaranteed as long as the Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [3] is hard. Informally, this problem con-
sists in deciding whether a tuple is sampled from the distribution (g, gx, gy, gxy)
or from the distribution (g, gx, gy, gz) for uniformly random (x, y, z)← Z3q . It is
believed to be hard in large prime order subgroups of Z∗p and in various groups
obtained from elliptic curves for instance. The hardness of this problem implies
the hardness of other related problems, including the discrete logarithm (DL)
problem, that states that is hard to compute x from inputs (g, gx) where x is
uniformly random in Zq.
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2.2 Perfectly hiding commitments
One of the most popular example of perfectly hiding commitment scheme was
introduced by Chaum et al. [5], and is often called the Pedersen commitment:
given two random generators g1 and g2 of the group G1,
1 we can commit on a
vote v ∈ Zq, by computing the value c = g
r
1
gv
2
for a random element r ← Zq.
An opening of this commitment is simply made of the values r and v (but we
later omit this last value, and assume that it can be efficiently computed by
exhaustive search, which is certainly the case when v is a single bit). This
scheme is perfectly hiding: since gr
1
is a uniformly random group element, the
resulting c is also uniformly distributed in G1 (this is equivalent to running a
one-time pad in G1). It is also binding if the DL problem is hard in G1: any
two distinct openings (r1, v1) and (r2, v2) of the same c would immediately lead
to computing the discrete logarithm of g2 in basis g1, which would be equal to
r2−r1
v1−v2
.
These commitments are quite appealing: they have a simple expression and
are homomorphic: the product of two commitments can be opened with the sum
of the committed values and randomnesses. This property is most useful, as it
makes it possible to multiply committed votes in order to obtain a commitment
on the sum of these votes.
In order to make a CCE scheme based on this commitment scheme, we would
then need to encrypt r (and possibly v as well) with an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme, so that the trustees would be able to compute an opening
of the product of the commitments on all votes. Unfortunately, traditional
additively homomorphic encryption schemes have either exponential decryption
time, which is not acceptable given the large size of r, or require using groups
of composite order, which we want to avoid for the reasons described above.
Recently, another way of opening these commitments was proposed by Abe
et al. [1], and can serve our purpose. The proposal is to use a second group
G2 of same prime order q, with generator h1, and to define the opening of a
commitment c = gr
1
gv
2
as a = hr
1
: computing that last value indeed seems to
require the knowledge of r. However, we need a mechanism to be able to verify
that a is really an opening of c for a given vote v. To this purpose, G1 and
G2 are chosen to be groups admitting an efficient bilinear map e : G1 × G2 →
GT , where GT is called the target group.
2 The bilinearity here implies that,
if e(g1, h1) = gT , then e(g
a
1
, hb
1
) = gabT . Thanks to this bilinear map, it is
possible to verify that a opens the commitment c for vote v by checking that
e(c/gv
2
, h1) = e(g1, a).
These commitments certainly remain perfectly hiding, for the same reason as
1Such generators can be obtained through a mapping from the outputs of a PRG or from
the digits of a public constant like the number pi.
2Choices for the groups G1 and G2 are based on elliptic curves admitting a so-called
Type 3 (asymmetric) pairing [8], which provide the most freedom and the most efficient
implementations in the pairing landscape. It is not difficult to transpose the schemes we
propose to the symmetric setting (Type 1 pairing), but the resulting solutions are less efficient
and cannot be based on the DDH problem anymore, since DDH is easy to solve in these groups
(the DLIN problem is a natural choice there.)
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above. The binding property holds if the DDH problem is hard in G1. Suppose
indeed that we get a DDH challenge tuple (g1, g
x
1
, gy
1
, gz
1
) and need to decide
whether z = xy or not. We can set g2 = g
x
1
and feed an adversary against the
commitment scheme with the bases (g1, g2, h1). This adversary will provide us
with two distinct openings (v1, a1) and (v2, a2) of a commitment of its choice.
We can now verify that z = xy if and only if e(gz
1
, h1) = e(g
y
1
, (a1/a2)
1
v2−v1 ).
So, we have a scheme that provides commitments that are as efficient to
compute as Pedersen commitments, but with openings that are group elements.
The opening verification operation becomes more expensive, though, as the
pairing operation is considerably more demanding than an exponentiation in
one of the base groups. However, this extra cost remains low at an election
scale as, when using homomorphic tallying techniques, we will only need to
verify one commitment opening per question, and not per voter. Furthermore,
since all computational operations are performed with public bases and secrets
in the exponents, this scheme is fully compatible with the most efficient sigma
proof techniques.
2.3 The PPATS scheme
In order to have an election with a perfectly private audit trail, we ask vot-
ers to commit on their votes using the scheme we just described. Talliers are
then expected to publish the election result, and show that they can open the
product of the committed votes to this result: this is a simple way to prove the
correctness of the outcome based on the binding property of the commitment
scheme.
The talliers then need a way to compute that opening, which simply is the
product of the openings of the individual votes. To this purpose, the voters
also send the opening of their individual votes to the talliers, protected using
an additively homomorphic threshold encryption scheme in order to make sure
that no subset of the talliers smaller than the chosen threshold would be able
to obtain information about individual votes. ElGamal encryption can be used
for that purpose and pairs nicely with the commitment scheme, as its security
also relies on the hardness of the DDH problem.
Protecting commitment openings with encryption can place the trustees in
a difficult position, though: they become unable to determine whether the en-
crypted information that is sent to them really contains an opening of a vote
commitment, or just an arbitrary value. The second case could lead to a very
uncomfortable situation, as the trustees would become unable to compute the
election results, and would have a hard time proving that they are acting in
good faith without violating or reducing the privacy of honest voters. A simple
solution to this issue is to require voters to prove the consistency of the CCE
ciphertexts they produce. This can be done using a sigma proof, thanks to the
structure of our commitment openings.
The resulting scheme is called the PPATS encryption scheme, and is de-
scribed in Table 3 (for efficiency reasons and consistency with the literature, we
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switch the roles of G1 and G2 compared to our text above: operations in G2 are
usually more expensive than those in G1.)
The PPATS encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, but its decryp-
tion procedure can be quite slow if the values to be decrypted are (very) large,
since the extraction of a discrete logarithm is required. This should not be a
problem for elections with homomorphic tallying (values up to 250 can still be
extracted in seconds using the baby-step giant-step algorithm), but may become
an issue if unpredictable write-ins need to be taken into account for instance.
For this purpose, the PPATC encryption scheme [7] can be used, which enables
efficient decryption and is compatible with efficient mixnets but is not additively
homomorphic anymore.
3 Voting based on PPATS encryption
The PPATS scheme can be conveniently used to build a voting scheme with
homomorphic tallying. We outline the main steps of a simple voting scheme
here. This process can of course be refined with various standard enhancements
(cast or audit procedure, . . . ) or adapted to completely different E2E voting
schemes.
1. Groups are chosen, depending on the security parameter, and made public.
2. Trustees generate a PPATS key in a threshold manner. Any protocol (see,
e.g., Gennaro et al. [9]) that can be used for DDH-based cryptosystems
can be used for PPATS encryption.
3. A public bulletin board is created, with the election description and the
PPATS public key (including information that may be necessary to verify
the validity of this key.)
4. Voters prepare their ballot by producing a PPATS encryption of a 0 or a 1
for each response to the questions. They also publicly prove the validity of
their vote by submitting, for the commitment included in each ciphertext,
a proof of knowledge σ0/1 of an opening of d to a 0 or a 1.
3
5. When receiving a ballot, the trustees (or the bulletin board, by delegation)
check the validity of all PPATS validity proofs and, if they check, the bul-
letin board publishes the commitments extracted from these ciphertexts
together with the 0/1 validity proofs on these commitments.
6. At the end of the election day, the trustees:
(a) check the validity of all proofs posted on the bulletin board. If the
proofs check, they
3For commitment d, this can be a disjunctive proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm
of either d or d/g2 in basis g1 [6].
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PPATS encryption
• Setup: Select type-3 pairing-friendly groups G1,G2,GT of prime
order q, together with random generators g1 of G1 and h1, h2 of
G2.
• Key Generation: Generate an ElGamal public encryption key g2 =
gx
1
. The secret key is x, possibly existing under a distributed
(threshold) form only.
• Encryption: Encrypt vote v as (c1, c2, d, σcc) =
(gs
1
, gr
1
gs
2
, hr
1
hv
2
, σcc), using uniformly random (r, s) ← Z
2
q ,
and the consistency proof σcc described in Table 4.
• Decryption: Extract the discrete logarithm of e(cx
1
/c2, h1)e(g1, d)
in basis e(g1, h2). (The computation of c
x
1
can be done in a dis-
tributed manner.)
• Extraction of commitment: The perfectly hiding commitment ex-
tracted from a ciphertext (c1, c2, d, σcc) is d.
• Extraction of commitment opening: The commitment opening is
computed as a = c2/c
x
1
.
• Opening verification: Given a commitment d and an opening a for
vote v, verify if e(a, h1) = e(g1, d/h
v
2
).
Table 3: The PPATS encryption scheme
PPATS Consistency Proof for triple c = (gs
1
, gr
1
gs
2
, hr
1
hv
2
)
• Commitment computation: Compute c′ = (c′
1
, c′
2
, d′) =
(gs
′
1
, gr
′
1
gs
′
2
, hr
′
1
hv
′
2
) using uniformly random (r′, s′, v′)← Z3q
• Challenge computation: Compute e = H(c, c′, label). Here, H is
a cryptographic hash function and label is a global public value
that contains the description of the groups that are used, together
with the generators of G1 and G2 used in the proof. It should
also contain some identifiers for the election and the purpose of
the proof.
• Response computation: Compute fr = r
′ + er, fs = s
′ + es and
fv = v
′ + ev.
The proof is defined as σcc = (e, fr, fs, fv).
PPATS Validity Verification for triple c = (c1, c2, d) and proof σcc =
(e, fr, fs, fv).
• Commitment reconstruction: Compute c′ = (c′
1
, c′
2
, d′) as follows:
c′
1
= gfs
1
/ce
1
, c′
2
= gfr
1
gfs
2
/ce
2
, c′
3
= hfr
1
hfv
2
/de.
• Challenge verification: Verify if e = H(c, c′, label).
The validity verification returns the result of the test above.
Table 4: PPATS Validity Proof
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(b) multiply the PPATS ciphertexts from all voters, response by response
(removing the consistency proofs), obtaining one ciphertext per re-
sponse encrypting the election results. Then, they
(c) extract and publish the commitment opening for each of the result-
ing ciphertext, and publish the decryption of the election results.
Eventually, they
(d) erase all secret keys.
7. Voters can verify the election as follows:
(a) Check the public parameters of the election (cryptographic parame-
ters, questions, voter list, . . . );
(b) Check the proper generation of the election public key;
(c) Check the validity of all votes committed on the bulletin board;
(d) Multiply the commitments from all voters, response by response,
obtaining one commitment per response, committing on the election
results;
(e) Check that the openings provided by the trustees match these com-
mitments.
This process is outlined and described in terms of the PPATS scheme in
Figure 1.
V1
V2
V3
Trustees
c
1,1 , c
2,1 , d
1 , σcc,1 , σ
0/1,1
c1,2, c2,2, d2, σcc,2, σ0/1,2
c1,3,
c2,3,
d3, σcc
,3, σ0
/1,3
Election
parameters
V1 : d1, σ0/1,1
V2 : d2, σ0/1,2
V3 : d3, σ0/1,3
result, a
Bulletin Board
if σcc,i check
Figure 1: Voting process representation for a single question, based on PPATS.
V1, V2 and V3 are voters. On the bulletin board, result is the decryption of
c = (
∏
c1,i,
∏
c2,i,
∏
di) and a =
∏
c2,i/
∏
cx
1,i.
This voting scheme satisfies the properties we were looking for. We have
E2E verifiability in the traditional sense: the correctness of the outcome does
not depend on any trustee, or on any secret information held by anyone. It does
depend on computational assumptions, though: fake results could pass the audit
procedure if the hash function used in the ZK proofs does not properly emulate
a random oracle, or if the DDH problem happens to be easy. These assumptions
are well-known and used in numerous other cryptographic schemes. Regarding
8
the confidentiality of the votes, we see that the content of the bulletin board is
perfectly hiding: it only contains an encryption key that is independent of the
votes, perfectly hiding commitments and perfect zero-knowledge proofs for all
votes and an opening of the public election results. So, these audit data cannot
help an adversary that would gain possession of the keys held by the trustees,
or would be able to solve computational problems that are believed to be hard
today.
4 Security Parameters and Efficiency Notes
Group selection. The most standard choice of curves admitting a type-3
pairing at the 128 bit security level is the BN curves [2], with 256 bit group order.
Various implementations of these curves are available, including in the PBC
library [10], the MIRACL cryptographic SDK [4], and the RELIC toolkit [11].
To provide a rough idea of running times, the benchmarks of the MIRACL
SDK indicate for these curves that exponentiations take .22 ms in G1, .44 ms
in G2, and that the pairing operation takes 20 ms (all on a 2010 Intel i5 520M
processor). If we focus on the cost of exponentiations when computing a ballot
(which is the dominant factor), we can count that a PPATS encryption of a
choice together with a 0/1 proof for the commitment takes 6 exponentiations
in G1 and 5 exponentiations in G2, for a total computing time of 3.52 ms. So,
a modern processor should be able to encrypt around 280 responses per second
using a single thread, without any precomputation.
Precomputation. Most of the computational work can be performed out
of critical moments, which can be useful in elections with large ballots. For
instance:
• All the exponentiations needed for computing a PPATS ciphertext are
independent of the actual choices made by the voter. A voting client
can then perform these operations in advance, while the voter makes his
selections for instance.
• All the exponentiations that are needed for ballot preparation and proof
verification are in fixed public bases, enabling the efficient use of various
precomputation methods, that usually provide a speedup factor between
2 and 3 for usual parameters.
• The validity of all proofs can be checked during the election day: there is
no need to wait until the closing of the polls.
• The PPATS ciphertexts can be multiplied together as they come. In this
way, the encrypted results can be available instantly when the polls close.
• The discrete logarithm extraction that is part of the decryption of the
election results can be immediate if all the powers of the DL basis have
been precomputed and stored, which is easy for any realistic election size.
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